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White v. Fleming: In Search of a Standard of Review for
Classifications Based on Sex-"Ever since Eve, mankind has
realized that one thing may lead to another . . . ." City of
Milwaukee v. Piscuine.1 Changing societal views concerning
women have done much to condemn legislation which has cast
upon women the role of moral menaces. Occasioned by this
change in attitude, not only has new legislation2 been enacted,
but challenges to sex-based classifications have become in-
creasingly frequent and successful. Unfortunately, in attempt-
ing to effectively set apart sex classifications due solely to pre-
judicial attitudes from those having a legitimate basis, the
courts have employed widely varying rationales for their deci-
sions. The resulting confusion as to which rationale is correct
has virtually left the courts free to roam within the ambit of
the equal protection clause, choosing or creating guidelines
they deem appropriate. Looking for a trend in the case law in
this area, the Seventh Circuit, in White v. Fleming,3 elicited
minimal guidelines for a test to be temporarily employed4 in
evaluating classifications based upon sex. Drawing upon lan-
guage from Eisenstadt v. Baird,5 the court stated that it will
"not accept a classification based solely on sex without further
inquiry as to whether the differences between men and women
rationally justify the classification."' The court took note that
there are anatomical and physiological differences between
men and women that may justify classifications for certain
purposes.7 It determined, however, that these differences do
not include a greater or lesser propensity for promiscuous sex-
ual activity thought to follow from contacts in taverns.8
Dorothy White, an entertainer, was arrested and charged
with unlawfully sitting with a male patron at the tavern in
which she worked in violation of section 90-25 of the Milwaukee
1. 18 Wis. 2d 599, 612, 119 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1963).
2. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq. (1964); Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
3. 522 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. Until it reexamines this area "[tihe precise terms of the test ultimately to be
evolved by the Supreme Court for judging the validity of a classification based on sex
cannot now be determined." Id. at 736.
5. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
6. 522 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1975).
7. Id. at 737.
8. Id.
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Code of Ordinances? Essentially, the ordinance prohibits, with
certain exceptions, female tavern employees from sitting with
male patrons or from being at or behind a bar, except to receive
food or drink orders for delivery to patrons who are not at the
bar.
The Milwaukee Common Council, upon enacting this ordi-
nance, included it within part V of the Milwaukee Code of
Ordinances-business and trade regulations.10 This would
seem to indicate that section 90-25 was designed to operate as
a regulation of the liquor industry. The state legislature allows
each individual city, town and village to issue or deny licenses
for the sale of intoxicating beverages." Such power necessarily
includes the authority to regulate the use of the liquor license
when granted. Recognizing the need for such authority, a
further grant was expressly given to these governing bodies to
adopt any additional regulations on the sale of such intoxicants
as local conditions in each community might warrant. 2 Under
this grant of power, the City of Milwaukee may adopt reasona-
ble regulations to control the conduct of the employees on
premises licensed for on-site consumption of intoxicating li-
quors. The Milwaukee Common Council adopted section 90-25
to regulate the contact between female employees and the pub-
lic in taverns. The ordinance was not intended to place any
restraints on the legitimate activities of female entertainers,
waitresses or employees, but only to prohibit conduct other
than that which would be required in such occupations-
9. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 90-25 (1974):
Any female entertainer, waitress, or female employe of any Class "B" fer-
mented malt beverage or Class "C" intoxicating liquor licensed premises who
shall at any time stand or sit at or behind the bar, except for the specific purpose
of receiving food or drink orders for delivery to patrons who are not at the bar,
or any female entertainer, waitress, or female employe who shall sit at any table
or in any booth or elsewhere on the premises with any male patron, shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) or in default of pay-
ment thereof be committed to the county jail or house of correction of Milwau-
kee county for not to exceed 60 days or until such fine and costs shall be paid.
• . . The provisions of this section shall not apply to licensed female bartenders,
or to female employes who are members of the immediate family and household
of the licensee, or to female entertainers while actually performing in an area
behind the bar which area is ordinarily used for back-bar entertainment. (Am.
Ord. 469, F.66-3715-b, passed Mar. 19, 1971).
10. Note also the existence, within Milwaukee's Code of Ordinances, of part
VI-public safety, morals and welfare.
11. WIs. STAT.§ 66.054 (1973).
12. Wis. STAT. §§ 66.054(12) -(13) (1973).
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conduct thought by the common council to lead to evils not
enumerated within its provisions which would adversely affect
the morals of the community. An examination of section 90-24
of the Milwaukee Code of Ordinances'3 further explains the
rationale behind the enactment of section 90-25.
A reading of the companion ordinance (Section 90-24) at
once discloses the practical difficulties of its enforcement. it
prohibits any person of the opposite sex "to him or her unac-
quainted" to issue an invitation for a drink.
If the person charged had been in the tavern before or only
casually talked to the entertainer, waitress, or female em-
ploye, the patron no longer was a person "theretofore to him
or her unacquainted." Further, under that ordinance it would
be necessary to establish the conversation between the female
employe and the patron to prove solicitation. It is thus appar-
ent that many subterfuges are readily available to circum-
vent the ordinance. Section 90-25 prevents fraternization or
mingling with patrons so as to prevent the evil at its incep-
tion.'4
Miss White challenged the constitutionality of this ordi-
nance, alleging that it deprived her of equal protection under
the law. The District Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin'" pointed out that "[w]hat is at issue here is not per se a
regulation of the liquor industry but an ordinance which cir-
cumscribes the conduct of an individual in a tavern: conduct
which would be legal in any other context but is herein made
illegal solely because of the sex of the individual."'" Indicating
the existence of a classification based on sex, the court applied
the standard of rationality17 and found that Milwaukee's bar-
girl ordinance was "so irrational and invidious that it is pat-
13. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 90-24 (1974):
Any person of either sex who shall solicit, appeal to, ask or invite another
person of the opposite sex theretofore to him or her unacquainted to purchase
for, procure for, or give to such person a drink of intoxicating liquor, malt
beverage, nonintoxicating liquor or soft drink in any Class "B" malt beverage
or Class "B" intoxicating liquor licensed premises, shall be punished by a fine
not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25), or in default of payment thereof be
committed to the county jail or house of correction of Milwaukee county not to
exceed 60 days or until such fine and costs shall be paid. ...
14. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 12-13, City of Milwaukee v. Piscuine, 18 Wis.
2d 599, 119 N.W.2d 442 (1963).
15. White v. Fleming, 374 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
16. Id. at 270.
17. Id. at 271.
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ently unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution."'" The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. 9
Until recent years the different treatment accorded women
was virtually immune from attack under the equal protection
clause."9 Applying the traditional rational basis test,2 sex-
based classifications were invariably deemed valid. These
courts began their inquiry by assuming that vast differences
between men and women existed, which eased the way to the
finding of a rational connection between the classification and
the legitimate interest advanced. 2
A leading case reflecting this approach was Goesaert v.
Cleary.23 This decision involved a challenge to a Michigan stat-
ute which forbade females generally from becoming barmaids,
but made an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of
the owners of the liquor establishments. The Court sustained
this sex classification, remarking, "[B]artending by women
may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral
and social problems against which it may devise preventive
measures .... ,,24 Cases subsequent to Goesaert have tended
to rely heavily upon its rationale in justifying similar legisla-
tion based upon sex against constitutional challenges. 2 Follow-
ing the Goesaert analysis, these courts have yielded to legisla-
18. Id. at 273.
19. 522 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975).
20. Id. at 731.
21. Traditionally, this process involves the existence of a legitimate governmental
objective and a determination that the legislative classification bears a rational rela-
tionship to that legitimate objective. Since the Supreme Court never declared sex to
be "suspect," sex-based classifications were not subjected to strict scrutiny. Under this
latter approach the Court inquires whether the challenged statute impinges upon a
fundamental interest or delineates a suspect classification. If so, such classification will
be upheld only if it serves a "compelling" state interest. This test will also strike down
a statute which, by examining the relationship between the classification and legisla-
tive objective, can reasonably be less restrictive and still achieve its purpose. See
generally Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974).
22. Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex,
1975 DUKE L. J. 163, 167 (1975).
23. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
24. Id. at 466.
25. E.g., Hargens v. Alcoholic Beverage Control App. Bd., 263 Cal. App. 2d 601,
69 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1968); State v. Burke, 79 Idaho 205, 312 P.2d 806 (1957);
Henson v. City of Chicago, 415 Ill. 564, 114 N.E.2d 778 (1953); City of Milwaukee v.
Piscuine, 18 Wis. 2d 599, 119 N.W.2d 442 (1963) (Upholding the ordinance challenged
in White).
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tive judgments concerning different treatment of the sexes. A
problem, however, has developed in employing the Goesaert
rationale. Given this general insensitivity of the courts toward
sex discrimination and the predominantly male membership of
legislative bodies, these cases "graphically illustrate the inef-
fectiveness of the permissive [traditional] rational basis test
in distinguishing classifications which might possibly have a
legitimate basis from those which are due solely to the preju-
diced attitudes of the legislators."2
In recent years, there has been a noticeable change in socie-
tal attitudes towards women. 27 Prompted by legislative activity
in the area of sex discrimination,2 the more recent court deci-
sions 29, which surely would have been controlled by Gorsaert
not so many years ago, have apparently abandoned Goesaert
and its approach. There exists, however, uncertainty and in-
consistency on the current standard of review. It is apparent
that though Goesaert has not been overruled, the courts today
seem to be less willing to defer to legislative regulations based
on sex classifications. Rather, the courts are subjecting these
classifications to a greater intensity of review. Two decisions
noted by the White court, Daugherty v. Daley" and Women's
Liberation Union of Rhode Island v. Israel,3 have invalidated
legislative regulations of the conduct of women in liquor estab-
lishments. Under the guise of limiting Goesaert to its facts, the
Seventh Circuit intimated that were it not for the recent devel-
opments in societal attitudes toward women and in equal pro-
tection law, these cases assuredly would have been controlled
by Goesaert.2 Suggesting that Goesaert was distinguishable
from the instant case, the court, pointing to Daugherty and
Women's Liberation Union, did not feel bound to extend its
26. Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex,
1975 DUKE L. J. 163, 170 (1975).
27. 522 F.2d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 1975).
28. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et. seq. (1964); Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
29. Women's Liberation Union of R.I. v. Israel, 512 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1975); Daugh-
erty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (three-judge court); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971); Commonwealth of Ky.,
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Burke, 481 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972).
30. 370 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (three-judge court).
31. 512 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1975).
32. 522 F.2d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 1975).
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holding. But in City of Milwaukee v. Piscuine,33 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court distinguished the statute challenged in
Goesaert as one which goes much farther than section 90-25 of
the Milwaukee Code of Ordinances.
Although it is true that in. . .Goesaert. . .the legisla-
tion prohibited female employment as bartenders in taverns
the Milwaukee ordinance has nothing to do with prohibiting
employment but regulates the conduct of female employees
in taverns. . . .[Goesaert held] that legislation prohibiting
such female employment is not contrary to the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. It follows that mere regulation
of the conduct of female employees as in the Milwaukee ordi-
nance does not violate that guarantee."
Piscuine states that though Goesaert is distinguishable
from the instant case, both cases should be treated similarly.
Goesaert would not have to be extended to apply to the chal-
lenged Milwaukee ordinance. Hence, since Goesaert is still law
today, the Seventh Circuit is not merely refusing to extend its
rationale to the instant case, it is refusing to follow its rationale
altogether.
The court did concede the applicability of another constitu-
tional provision that Goesaert was grounded upon. As with the
statute in Goesaert, the ordinance involved in the instant case
is related to conduct within the confines of liquor establish-
ments. As such, the municipality places great emphasis upon
the plenary power of the state under the twenty-first amend-
ment 5 to proscribe certain conduct in its taverns. This power
was recognized in Goesaert and recently reaffirmed in
California v. LaRue."6 The applicability of this amendment,
however, is not determinative of the challenge. Undoubtedly
the twenty-first amendment strengthens the case for the city,
but does not render inapplicable other constitutional provi-
sions. "It is still necessary to consider and apply the appropri-
ate equal protection test."37 From this starting point the Sev-
33. 18 Wis. 2d 599, 119 N.W.2d 442 (1963).
34. Id. at 607, 119 N.W.2d at 447.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
36. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
37. 522 F.2d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 1975).
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enth Circuit began its search for the current standard of review
for sex-based legislation.
Briefly examining the Supreme Court's pronouncements
concerning sex classifications in Reed v. Reed38 and Frontiero
v. Richardson," the Seventh Circuit felt it inappropriate at this
time to subject the challenged ordinance to the strict scrutiny
standard." The cases since Frontiero which have addressed the
issue of the appropriate treatment under the equal protection
clause of legislation which disadvantages women, have still
refused to declare whether sex-based classifications are inher-
ently suspect."
Refusing to apply the highest standard of review, the courts
then turned to an examination of the minimal standard re-
quired for the validity of legislative classifications-the ra-
tional basis test. Under this analysis the courts have required
legislative classifications not deemed to be either suspect or
fundamental to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate
legislative purpose.42 Traditionally, the classification will be
valid "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.'43 In recent years this approach, which of necessity
38. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). A unanimous Court held invalid an Idaho statute which
gave preference to men as administrators of decedents' estates under the equal protec-
tion clause.
39. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In a plurality decision by the Court, sex-based classifica-
tions of members of the uniformed services for purposes of dependents' benefits were
held to be unjustifiably discriminatory. Four of the justices believed sex to be inher-
ently suspect, and therefore subject to close judicial scrutiny. The other justices, how-
ever, remained uncommitted.
40. 522 F.2d 730, 733-34 (7th Cir. 1975). Mr. Justice Powell, in his concurrence in
Frontiero which was joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun, deferred
from categorizing sex as a suspect classification in light of the pendency before the
state legislatures of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, "which if adopted will
resolve the substance of this precise question." 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973). Other courts,
however, have found that sexual classifications are to be properly treated as suspect,
requiring the strictest test of judicial scrutiny. See United States ex rel. Robinson v.
York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971).
41. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975).
42. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
43. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). This interpretaion of the
rational basis test involves the least amount of scrutiny ever employed by the Court.
A decade later, the Burger Court interpreted the rational basis test as requiring that
"a fair and substantial relation" exist between the legislative goal and the classifica-
1976]
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requires a considerable amount of judicial restraint, has
seemed to be losing momentum. The Court has been "less will-
ing than it formerly had been to ascribe legitimate purposes to
the legislative body."4 The Court's devotion to judicial re-
straint waned as it seemed to subject certain classifications to
a greater intensity of review. 5 Included within these classifica-
tions are those based upon sex. The recent decision in
Weinberger v. Salfi5 has called a halt to this trend. In that case
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional rational basis
standard in disposing of constitutional challenges to social wel-
fare legislation.47 In failing to extend a greater intensity of re-
view to the classification before it, the Court made no mention
as to its applicability to Reed and Frontiero and sex classifica-
tions.
The real confusion, however, arises from numerous lower
court decisions"8 which have interpreted Reed as recognizing
the existence of a third standard, somewhere between the ra-
tional basis and strict scrutinty tests, for use in sex classifica-
tion cases. The "intermediate" standard has been attributed to
the language in Reed which calls for a "fair and substantial"
relation to exist between the basis of the classification and the
object intended to be achieved. More recently the existence
tion. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). This is where the confusion arises. Is the
"fair and substantial" requirement of Reed to be interpreted as the standard of the
rational basis test, or of an intermediate test? The "fair and substantial" criteria
seemingly requires a greater degree of scrutiny than the McGowan standard. Since,
however, these words have come from F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920), it could be argued that this standard is really nothing but an applica-
tion of the rational basis test. A reading of Reed alone will not solve the problem.
44. 522 F.2d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 1975).
45. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 33-37 (1972).
46. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
47. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
48. E.g., Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th
Cir. 1974); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1973); Wark v. Robbins,
458 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.4 (1st Cir. 1972).
49. Citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), Reed
required that "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation .... '" 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See generally Gunther, The Supreme
Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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of an intermediate test was thrown into doubt by the Supreme
Court's application of a rational basis test in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,5 ° reversing the Second Circuit's decision which
had applied a less deferential test. Hence, it appears "unclear
whether the Court now accepts an intermediate form of equal
protection analysis."'5' And yet, though the Seventh Circuit
could not evince a clear test from the Supreme Court to apply
in judging the validity of sex-based classifications, it seemed
to find that the sum total of the case law in this area requires
that a special significance be imputed to sex classifications. It
chose to review the legislation with a greater degree of scrutiny
by refusing to accept "a classification based solely on sex with-
out a further inquiry as to whether the difference between men
and women rationally justify the classification. '52
What is interesting about the Seventh Circuit's opinion is
the manner in which the court implemented this test in declar-
ing the provisions of the Milwaukee ordinance to be in violation
of the equal protection clause. Referring to the proffered mu-
nicipal interest of reducing the planning of promiscuous sexual
activity" by means of restricting the conduct of female tavern
employees, the court conspicuously avoided comment on the
legitimacy of the interest sought to be achieved and the futher-
ance of the ordinance's objective by the classification. It cannot
be denied that protecting the moral well-being of the com-
munity is a legitimate concern of the municipal government,
nor can it be said that this concern is not furthered by the
ordinance. 4 The conclusion seems inescapable that the legisla-
50. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Significantly, this case did not involve a sex classification;
rather, the subject concerned the constitutionality of a village zoning ordinance limit-
ing the occupancy of one-family dwellings to traditional families or to groups of not
more than two unrelated persons. The ordinance was upheld. See also Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). In this case the Court, finding no "rational relationship"
to exist, declared that a Utah statute specifying a greater age of majority for males
than for females, in the context of child support, denies equal protection.
51. Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1068 n.5 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975). Again, no mention was made concerning the
applicability of a less deferential test to sex-based classifications.
52. 522 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 1975).
53. The Milwaukee Common Council intended the ordinance as an instrument of
morality which would make more difficult any designs for a later immoral encounter
between a male patron and the female employee. The interest of prohibiting the
solicitation of drinks by female employees for the protection of male patrons is the
subject of another Milwaukee ordinance, according to City of Milwaukee v. Piscuine,
18 Wis. 2d 599, 612, 119 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1963).
54. There should be no question as to the chemistry of man's attraction to his
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tive interest is legitimate, and also that there is indeed a ra-
tional relationship between the classification and that legiti-
mate objective. It would seem, therefore, that the court could
have reached its decision only by shielding those disadvan-
taged by a classification based on sex with some special protec-
tion.
The effect of rendering special significance, at least implic-
itly, to sex classifications indicates the application of a stan-
dard higher than the rational basis test. Indeed, because the
classification was based solely on sex, the court deemed it nec-
essary to make a further inquiry as to whether the difference
between a man and a woman rationally justifies different treat-
ment. The court felt it necessary, in the area of sex classifica-
tions, to review the underlying legislative assumptions in light
of this nation's long history of sex discrimination to see that no
"stereotyped assumptions concerning propensities thought to
exist in some members of a given sex" become the basis for
legislation.5 Application of the Seventh Circuit's test, however,
does not eliminate the major concern inherently marked upon
sex classification legislation-the problem of distinguishing
classifications which -might possibly have a legitimate basis
from those which are due solely to the prejudicial attitudes of
the legislators.51 Is it that the men on the bench feel that they
are better qualified than the men in the legislature to spot
which sex classifications are based on stereotyped assump-
tions, and therefore impermissible, and which are not, and
therefore permissible? This arrogant attitude has caused the
court to overlook a fundamental fact. "Without . . . 'sex-
unique' differences, men would be indistinguishable from
women, and the issue of sex discrimination would never have
arisen in the first place. 57 The solution is not in trying to zero
female counterpart. It did not end with the current legislative and judicial concern over
the changing role of women in society. Contact between men and women in liquor
establishments may indeed lead to promiscuous sexual activity.
55. 522 F.2d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1975).
56. Not discussed or treated in this opinion is the problem of ameliorative sex-
based classifications, those which attempt to alleviate the effects of past discrimina-
tion toward women. Whether the Seventh Circuit's analysis can be, or was intended
to be, applied to ameliorative classifications is open to question. For a discussion of
how these classifications have been analyzed under the equal protection clause, see
Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE
L. J. 163 (1975); Comment, Constitutional Law: Ameliorative Sex Classification and
the Equal Protection Clause, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 127 (1975).
57. Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of
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in on the stereotyped assumptions thought to exist in one sex
over another; rather, the key is in recognizing that the "sex-
unique" differences lie at the heart of sex classifications.
Appearing to offer workable guidelines to be employed
in dealing with sex-based classifications, the court has actually
offered little to help solve the problem of the nature of the
standard of review to be applied in this area. While the court's
language seems to dispel any reliance on the Goesaert ration-
ale, just where its analysis of sex-based classifications fits in
relation to the "minimal-intermediate-strict scrutiny" trilogy
is open to question. Although not invalidating all classifica-
tions based on sex, when the court finds that the classification
is purportedly related to the accomplishment of a legitimate
legislative objective, and that objective could be accomplished
by the challenged classification, the failure of the court to find
a rational basis for the different treatment of men and women
within the ordinance would render the classification arbitrary
and violative of the equal protection clause. The practical
effect of this analysis is to say that sex is inherently sus-
pect under the traditional two-tier equal protection analysis."
If it is granted, however, that no "compelling state inter-
est" is necessary because sex is not a- suspect classification,
the court's analysis requires the application of an intermed-
iate equal protection test. Requiring that a further inquiry
be made as to whether the differences between men and women
rationally justify the classification, the court compels a "more
than rational" connection exist between the legitimate legisla-
tive goal and the classification. Both interpretations are plausi-
ble, but which is proper and correct? The court gives no an-
swer. As numerous other courts, the Seventh Circuit is waver-
ing indecisively between classifying sex as suspect and recog-
nizing the existence of an intermediate equal protection test for
sex-based legislation.
The present status of sex-based classifications under the
Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 441, 461 (1975).
58. Under this analysis an initial inquiry is made as to whether a fundamental
right-suspect classification is involved. If so, a "compelling state interest" is required
to uphold the statute's classification. If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect
classification is found, the Court requires the petitioner to prove that the statute has
no rational basis.
1976]
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equal protection clause remains uncertain. While the Goesaert
rationale appears no longer applicable, a clear standard has not
emerged to take its place. Indeed, there is a wide divergence
in the standard that the courts have applied.59 Until the Su-
preme Court articulates why some classifications of persons are
or are not entitled to any form of protection beyond that re-
quired by the most minimal standard, the members of such
classes may well feel that the courts' -eview is as arbitrary as
the challenged legislation.
DONALD J. WALL
59. Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex,
1975 DUKE L.J. 163, 177 (1975).
